This paper aims to identify the reasons why economic growth in Egypt, although comparable to its peers, failed to significantly reduce unemployment, lower poverty levels or raise overall productivity. We use cross-country comparisons, counterfactual scenarios and regression analysis to demonstrate that Egypt, even during the high growth period of 2000-10, did not experience a reallocation of excess labour towards modern, productive sectors similar to what occurred in other emerging markets, notably in South East Asia. The results show that, while there is large potential for productivity gains in the Egyptian economy, a limited openness to trade, a low diversification of exports and deficient access to finance prevented the country from witnessing a structural shift of its labour force towards manufacturing and private services, locking Egypt instead within a "low value trap". The paper then suggests some policy implications of these findings, relating to overcoming the main impediments to preventing an efficient sectoral reallocation of workers.
Introduction
Many analysts 1 have stressed the underlying economic roots of the popular uprisings that toppled autocratic leaders in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt's 2011 revolution highlighted the public demands for higher welfare and social justice. A puzzling feature for observers, however, was that the uprisings occurred after a decade of relatively strong growth performance in the region. In Egypt in particular, growth rates surpassed 5 per cent between 2004 and 2011. Why, then, did the revolution of 2011, and popular unrest demanding higher living standards for the middle class, occur at the moment when Egypt's economy, from a bird's eye perspective, appeared to be taking off?
A closer look at Egypt's growth performance shows that both labour productivity and income per capita increased at a much slower pace than real GDP (Chart 1). Moreover, despite high output growth, unemployment remained above 8 per cent throughout the decade.
Chart 1: Growth of real GDP, GDP/capita and labour productivity in Egypt
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, United Nations World Productivity Database.
Furthermore, growth dividends in Egypt did not trickle down to workers, with the share of wages in GDP decreasing persistently so that workers were "getting an increasingly smaller slice of a growing pie" 2 (Chart 2). Such a feature helps to explain why the Egyptian middle class felt it was not reaping the benefits of improved economic performance, despite high overall economic growth.
The share of output going to workers' wages has been declining more rapidly in Egypt than in peer countries, standing close to 25 per cent of the value added in 2009 (Chart 3), a strikingly low share by international standards, even among emerging countries. These specificities of Egypt's growth model (stubbornly high unemployment, and a low and declining share of wages in GDP) suggest a common cause: the inability of Egypt's economy to deliver jobs in high-labour productivity industries. Indeed, this failure to provide enough "good quality" jobs that match the qualifications of its labour force could explain both the high unemployment rate, even among educated workers, and the low share of wages, as workers concentrate in low-productivity industries.
This belief is consistent with another striking element of Egypt's economic growth in the years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . While growth in emerging markets has often been associated with structural change in the sector mix 3 , the sectoral distribution of Egypt's GDP has remained broadly unchanged throughout the decade (Chart 4).
Chart 4: Sectoral distribution of real GDP (%) in Egypt
Source: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. This paper therefore attempts to solve the puzzle of Egypt's "lost decade of productivity", using a sectoral approach to understand why overall economic growth was not matched by a corresponding increase in income per capita. Understanding the constraints on structural change in Egypt is especially urgent, at a time when income per capita has been stagnating in the years following the revolution, and unemployment stands close to 13 per cent. The ability of Egypt's economy to deliver jobs in "modern" sectors to its growing working-age population is a matter not only of economic efficiency, but also of social justice and socio-political stability.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We show how our study contributes to the field of quantitative analysis of the determinants of structural change and provides a sectoral approach to growth that had not yet been applied to Egypt (section 2). After providing a brief summary of the methodology and data used (section 3), we document the extent to which, in spite of impressive output growth on paper, the Egyptian economy did not witness a degree of structural change 3 Commonly defined as the process of reallocation of excess labour from traditional industries towards more productive sectors. Agriculture Public and Social Services Industry Production Services comparable to peers, by decomposing the sources of productivity growth (section 4). This comparative approach is used to explain various stylised facts characterising growth in Egypt from 2000 to 2010, namely the absence of significant improvements in job creation, sector diversification and poverty reduction (section 5). To account for the specificities of Egypt's case, we then turn to cross-country analysis to assess the relative importance of several factors in igniting a structural reallocation of labour towards modern sectors (section 6). Based on such findings and taking into account the reversal of structural change in the years after the revolution, we suggest policy recommendations that could be more conducive to sustained structural change in Egypt (section 7).
Literature review
A major concern in recent years has been how to reconcile strong economic performance in developing countries with the persistence of widespread poverty, low standards of living and income inequality. Many studies find that the benefits of economic growth are often unevenly distributed across the population, and that a country's pattern of development may be just as important as the level of per capita GDP attained (see Ravallion, 2001; Bourguignon, 2003; Essama-Nssah and Lambert, 2009) . In other words, the issue is not merely to grow aggregate output, but to grow "in D.E.P.T.H.": Diversifying production, increasing Exports, enhancing Productivity of farms, firms and government offices, and upgrading Technology, to improve Human development (see African Center for Economic Transformation, 2014).
In advanced economies, growth results mainly from higher productivity, through a process of creative destruction within existing industries: new and more efficient technologies emerge, and less productive firms are forced to exit markets (see, for example, Aghion, Howitt, 1992) . In emerging and developing economies, a more relevant paradigm for growth is the "structural change" dimension: not productivity growth within each sector, but the reallocation of labour across industries, from traditional low-productivity sectors to more dynamic (higher-productivity) economic activities (see Timmer and Akkus, 2008) . This structural change has been a major contributor to the rise in standards of living, the reduction in poverty, and the provision of better jobs that accompany economic development.
Theoretically, the phenomenon of structural change was first modelled through a "dual-economy" approach (Lewis, 1954; Kuznets, 1955) , where workers gradually move from subsistence agriculture towards the production of manufactured goods in capital-intensive sectors. As the initial excess labour is reallocated to more technologically advanced -or more effectively organised -industries, the country's living standards improve. Theoretical studies associating "modern" sectors, such as manufacturing and utilities, with increasing returns to scale (Hirschman, 1958; Arthur, 1989; Krugman, 1991) also showcase how reallocation of labour from constant returns activities (notably agriculture or construction) to more productive sectors plays an instrumental role in fostering sustainable growth.
Moving towards higher value-added activities has concrete consequences on the level of development and standard of living. From a historical standpoint, Maddison's Millennial Perspective on the World Economy (2001) shows how the lack of such a reallocation affects longterm income growth. For centuries leading up to the industrial revolution in Europe, GDP per capita failed to increase, as most of the working age population remained employed in agriculture: growth in output due to technological changes was matched almost immediately by a rise in the population headcount, a phenomenon labelled the "Malthusian trap" (Clark, 2005) . Similar patterns were observed in Egypt in recent years, as GDP per capita failed to increase in line with peer countries before the revolution, and remained flat afterwards. Empirical evidence has also confirmed that the "structural change" element has major consequences on how economic growth in emerging countries translates into job creation and poverty reduction (Ocampo, Rada and Taylor, 2009; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; UNIDO, 2012) .
Given the fundamental role of structural change in achieving a higher level of development, it is essential to understand the determinants of this evolution and what favours or hampers it. Some studies have attempted to identify binding constraints on the efficient reallocation of labour in the economy. Several contributions focus on specific determinants of structural change, including the role of aid (Page, 2012) , trade (Balassa, 1979) , or institutions (Rodrik, 2007) , but only a few studies have taken a quantitative view on a variety of factors from a cross-section perspective to explain the degree of structural change -or lack thereof -within a particular country. 4 Crosscountry studies on structural change have focused on descriptive aspects of the decomposition of labour productivity growth (see Kucera, 2013, or Eberhardt and Teal, 2013) , but have not emphasised explanatory factors driving the variation of the structural change component among countries, with the exception of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) , who looked at the role of employment rigidity or exchange rate undervaluation, and Barbier and Bugas (2014) , who monitored the impact of available arable land. Our study therefore attempts to provide a crosscountry perspective, not only on the degree, but also and more importantly on the determinants of structural change, by using a longer timeframe and a new set of countries, notably including Egypt.
Despite the potential importance of structural transformation in driving more sustainable and inclusive growth in Egypt, the subject has not been examined in the literature. Existing studies on Egypt's economic sectors have focused on the issue of diversification (Herrera et al., 2010) , allocative efficiency in the labour market (Hassan and Sassanpour, 2008; Yassine, 2013) , and the comparative impact of the 2011 revolution across sectors (Hosny et al, 2013) . We contribute to the literature by adopting a sector-level approach to economic growth in Egypt, relating it to the issue of structural change. The paper documents and explains the relatively low importance of the structural change component of growth in Egypt, compared with peers. It then examines the determinants of this structural transformation from a cross-country perspective using data for 28 countries over two decades, in order to determine the main factors affecting the degree and pace of structural change.
Data and stylised facts
Our objective is to examine the extent of structural transformation in Egypt over the last decade and to put it in international context. We use sectoral data from a number of sources, regrouping them into nine key sectors. After carrying out a number of transformations to obtain consistent data series across time for each country, we obtain observations for value added by sector, employment by sector and price level by sector, which enable us to compute comparable PPP labour productivity levels by country for each of these nine sectors, across two decades (see the Data Appendix for more details on data transformation While the Egyptian economy seems to be broadly diversified across sectors in terms of output, with six sectors out of nine each accounting for more than 10 per cent of GDP, employment is highly concentrated in a few less productive sectors. Jobs in agriculture and the public sector (including health and education services) together account for more than half of total employment, but their share in output is only 30 per cent. Although a series of earlier reforms aimed to curb the proportion of public sector jobs, their importance has remained largely unchanged in recent years. Moreover, moves by post-revolution governments to boost army and civil servant salaries by 15 per cent and to convert temporary positions into permanent ones are expected to contribute to the large share of employment in the public sector.
Productivity across sectors displays large variations, as shown in Table 1 , with some of the least productive sectors employing a particularly large share of the population, notably construction and agriculture. These two sectors, in particular, with productivity below 50 per cent of the economywide average, did not see a significant decline in employment over the past decade. Highly productive sectors (notably mining, an outlier for labour productivity given the very low share of labour employed in the sector, and financial services) employ a low proportion of the overall labour force, which stagnated in terms of overall employment share over the last decade. Indeed, Egypt's productivity gaps across sectors are high, with the coefficient of variation of labour productivity between sectors among the largest in our sample of countries (Chart 5). Large variations in labour productivity across sectors (that is, productivity gaps) characterise lower income and lower productivity countries. Egypt's performance on this measure therefore reemphasises the need for a structural transformation to raise productivity growth through a redistribution of labour across sectors where wide cross-sectoral variations in labour productivity exist. Egypt's sectoral productivity levels lie in the lower half of our sample for most sectors, with the notable exception of mining, where average labour productivity stands at high levels even compared with international standards, given the low share of labour employed in the industry and its high capital intensity (Table 2) . Several sectors such as public utilities, construction, and finance, insurance and real estate perform particularly poorly by international comparisons, reflecting poor efficiency and business climate in these sectors. In the case of financial and real estate services, despite its relatively high productivity compared with other sectors in Egypt, it significantly lags behind international comparators, highlighting the extent of the potential gains in expanding and modernising the services sectors in Egypt. 
Share

Decomposition of productivity growth
Growth in labour productivity can be attributed to two distinct components, which are often but not always complementary: a within-sector effect, where technological improvements increase productivity in a given economic activity, holding the capital-labour ratio in that sector constant, and a between-sector effect, where more labour is allocated to productive economic activities.
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The following function captures the decomposition of aggregate labour productivity growth over the given period (t − k to t) into these two components respectively, where θ i,t represents the sectoral share of employment in sector i at time t for the n sectors, Y t is overall productivity at time t, y i,t represents productivity in sector i at time t, and Δ captures the change in a given variable from t − k to t:
The first term of the sum represents the growth of productivity within each sector, weighted by the labour share of each sector in the beginning time period. The second term of the sum captures the increase in overall productivity resulting from labour reallocation between sectors. This "structural change" term is positive when labour is reallocated towards sectors with higher relative productivity, and negative in the opposite case. The key rationale is that higher productivity growth within a given sector can have ambiguous effects on overall productivity, depending on whether redundant workers are then reallocated to lower productivity activities.
For Egypt, the decomposition of labour productivity growth at a sectoral level shows large disparities between the contributions to productivity growth within sectors, and an overall negative impact of reallocation (Chart 6) mainly attributable to mining, where employment decreased despite a sector productivity level well above average.
The analysis uncovers a negative labour reallocation effect in construction, a relatively unproductive sector which has expanded its share of employment in the last decade. Moreover, although a decrease in the employment share of agriculture and an increase in that of manufacturing did occur, both were limited and did not result in a strong positive reallocation effect. Finally, the decrease in mining employment has a high impact on overall productivity growth given the high level of productivity per worker in this sector, but is also less significant given the very low share of overall employment represented by the mining sector. We also analyse changes in labour productivity at a sector level (Figure 7) , and find that withinsector improvements were responsible for the bulk of productivity growth across time, notably in the mining and extractive industries, in private services and in manufacturing. 
Analysis of structural change in Egypt
A crucial way that lower income countries can raise their growth prospects is by increasing the productivity of the labour force as workers move from traditional lower-productivity sectors to higher productivity modern service and manufacturing jobs. For a labour-abundant country such as Egypt, this is even more vital. A boost in overall labour productivity from this type of structural transformation would raise Egypt's economic growth potential while expanding opportunities for better jobs in productive sectors.
To gain insights into the extent of structural transformation in Egypt over the last decade, we examine the correlation between changes in labour share across sectors, and productivity levels. We plot the (end-of-period) relative productivity of sectors against the change in their employment share over a decade. The relative size of each sector (measured by initial employment share) is indicated by the area of the circle around each sector's label in the scatter plots. The "ideal" path of development of a typical middle-income economy would follow a process where advanced sectors (those with the highest relative productivity) would witness an increase of their share in the labour force. By contrast, sectors with the largest initial employment, and lower than average productivity, would see their share of employment shrink rapidly (see Chart 8).
Chart 8: A stylised view of the "ideal" structural change process
Source: Authors' illustration.
We demonstrate that such a process did not occur in Egypt and that structural change was almost flat or negative (see Chart 10) in the decade prior to the historic revolution that took place in January 2011. Not only did labour fail to significantly shift from agriculture towards higher value added sectors in Egypt, as might be expected in the case of a lower-middle income economy, but it also remained concentrated in activities with relatively low productivity, such as construction and the public sector. This contrasts with the experience of many emerging market economies, To better illustrate the lost opportunity for structural change in the course of Egypt's economic development, we compare the country's experience with Turkey and Thailand. The choice of these countries as comparators for Egypt stems from two main reasons: on the one hand, they have similar population levels (18th and 20th respectively in terms of world population ranking, close to Egypt's 15th place) and similar initial distribution of employment across sectors; on the other hand, these countries, while initially comparable to Egypt, experienced a significant structural shift of labour towards modern industries, to such an extent that they outpaced Egypt's growth rate and development levels in a decade. Since the decade of high-paced economic development occurred between 1990 and 2000 in these peer countries, data for this decade are used in order to start from levels of GDP and GDP per capita comparable to Egypt during 2000-2010.
All three economies had a similar share of employment in "modern" sectors (namely industry and productive services) at the beginning of the decade (2000 for Egypt, and 1990 for comparators).
The overall distribution of sectors by relative productivity (rather than by nature of output) shows a similar pattern between these countries (Chart 9), with the three sectors with the lowest productivity representing a similar share of employment. However, while the most productive sectors represent a comparable share of the labour force in Egypt as in peer countries, its least productive sectors (construction and agriculture) do represent a lower share than their counterparts in Thailand and Turkey, thus leaving less room for reallocation towards more productive sectors. Charts 11 and 12 contrast Egypt's economic transformation with that of Thailand and Turkey, in which the level of PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in the 1990s was similar to Egypt in the 2000s. These countries experienced large increases in the employment share of relatively productive sectors -in particular, manufacturing and tourism -which offset a large contraction of employment in agriculture. Better reallocation of labour allowed for a rise in both wages and value added. 7 The chart shows the change in each sector's share of employment (on the x-axis) plotted against the sector's relative labour productivity (in log terms, y-axis). Relative labour productivity is end-of-period sector GDP per person employed as a share of the economy-wide GDP per person employed. The size of the circle represents the share of employment at the beginning of the period. Clearly, the decline in the employment share of low-productivity sectors in Egypt has been slow. Over 50 per cent of employed Egyptians still worked in agriculture or in the public sector in 2010. The largest rise in the share of jobs over the decade was in construction, an unproductive sector already burdened by a lack of modernisation and an abundance of unskilled workers, but supported by large energy subsidies reducing the cost of building materials, notably cement. Meanwhile, the employment share of private sector services and industrial manufacturing had almost stagnated, sharply contrasting with other emerging economies.
A counterfactual scenario
Comparing Egypt with Turkey demonstrates how significant this transformation in employment structure can be. A recent study of the growth elasticity of employment in Turkey and Egypt (Abdel-Khalek, 2010) demonstrated how Egypt's productivity growth mainly arose from extractive industries, representing low overall employment, and the informal sector, while in Turkey it stemmed from manufacturing and export-oriented sectors. We construct a counterfactual scenario where Egypt's relative sectoral productivities are unchanged (that is, they stay exactly as they were over the decade 2000-10), but modify the share of employment in each sector at the end of the decade. Instead of using the actual sectoral share of employment in Egypt, we apply Turkey's structure of employment as of 2009.
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We measure the lost opportunity by evaluating the additional overall productivity (Y potential − Y actual ) that could be gained if Egypt had a similar sector mix θ Other,t to Turkey, under the following form:
Although Turkey had a higher PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in 2009 than Egypt, it remains a good comparator and is especially relevant in terms of similar employment and population size, and cultural and historical similarities. Its labour share in agriculture is about 4 per cent lower, its share in industry is almost the same, but the starkest difference comes in private sector services, which together make up almost 33 per cent of Turkey's jobs (versus 24 per cent in Egypt), and its somewhat lower share in the public sector.
What we find is that, applying equation (2),that is, assuming no changes in Egypt's within-sector productivity, a between-sector reallocation of jobs to services could have a dramatic impact. The structural change alone would translate into a 17 per cent increase in the economy's labour productivity (Table 3) . 
Trends after the revolution
Although it is still early to forecast how Egypt's economy will be transformed in the wake of the revolution and recent political instability, it is clear that some sectors will take longer to recover than others. In fact, using the same approach as in the cross-country comparison, we find that over the last two years the share of public sector jobs has risen at the expense of jobs in higherproductivity sectors like mining and manufacturing, tourism and finance (see Chart 13). Although the time period is not long enough to draw conclusions, it signals a potentially alarming outcome if the trend continues and no action is taken. If this were the case, advances that increase withinsector productivity would be partly counteracted down by labour movements between sectors that are productivity reducing. Based on these data for the years 2010-12, we project the same trends over a decade and find that the sectors with the lowest relative productivity (construction and the public sector) would see a dramatic increase in their share of the labour force, while sectors with the highest productivity (notably manufacturing) would see their share decrease, further maintaining the pattern of growth-reducing structural change (see Chart 14). Using 2010 relative labour productivities (beginning of period, given that end of period data are obviously not available), we observe the extent of such a growth-reducing path for the structural component of productivity growth, measured by the downwards-sloping relationship between relative productivity and projected change in employment in Chart 14 below. 
Cross-country analysis of the determinants of structural change
We investigate the determinants of structural change in a cross-country panel using a new data set, which expands the McMillan and Rodrik figures, for 28 countries from 1990 and up to 2010, thus providing us with two decades of sectoral data for value added and employment per country. We compute the level of overall productivity growth attributable to structural change and to within productivity growth for each country in the database, for both decades, using equation (1). The exercise yields the following country ranking for the structural component of productivity growth (Table 4) . It is evident that growth-enhancing structural change was a key determinant of the good economic performance of East Asian countries over the period, an outcome of their growth model orientation towards exports and the tradable, high-productivity sector, notably for China, India or Thailand. In contrast, structural change played a negligible role in high-income countries, where productivity variation among sectors is lower, and gains mainly come from improved within productivity. These findings are consistent with the empirical literature on the geographic variation of structural change, including Roncolato and Kucera (2013) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) . We also observe that the best performers did so mainly in the second decade of our sample, while structural change was less impressive during the first decade. However, Egypt comes out as an outlier, with structural change flat or negative from 2000 to 2010 despite its lower middle-income status.
We use regression analysis to identify the main factors explaining the level of structural change across countries. The dependent variable is the structural change term over a decade, measured as the cumulative labour productivity growth over a decade attributable to the reallocation of labour. The impact of exogenous parameters on the level of the structural change is examined using the following specification:
with SC i the structural change term in a given country i, X i the exports of country i, the imports of country i, X i raw the raw material exports, Agriculture i t−1 L i ⁄ the share of agriculture in total employment, X i + M i GDP i ⁄ the openness of the economy of country i measured as the ratio of the GDP of country i, ⁄ the share of credit to private sector in GDP of country i, γ i a regional dummy capturing fixed regional effects, HI, AF and ASI regional dummies for highincome countries, Africa and Asia, and an error term ε.
Control variables are extracted from a number of sources, including UN Comtrade for data on the share of primary commodities in exports or trade openness, the External Wealth of Nations database for foreign assets and liabilities, the Penn World Tables for capital per worker, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators for domestic credit to the private sector.
The choice of this specification reflects existing expectations in the literature (notably, that a large untapped workforce in agriculture constitutes a favourable environment to structural change, as shown in McMillan and Rodrik (2011) , or that initial specialisation in commodity exports is likely to slow down any such reallocation process). However, we also include important determinants that have been overlooked in previous studies. In particular, we study whether factors often associated with a rise in total factor productivity (for example, an increased openness to trade and better access to credit) were likely to increase productivity not only through access to capital and technology within sectors, but specifically by encouraging the shift of labour towards modern sectors. A reasonable expectation is that initially having a large share of employment in agriculture increases the potential for structural change, since more room is available for growthaugmenting labour reallocation. This is consistent with McMillan and Rodrik's findings that an initial larger share of labour in agriculture provides an opportunity for low-and middleincome countries. We use the share of agriculture in employment at the beginning of the decade to examine the impact of surplus labour in agriculture on the potential for structural change, and find a positive and statistically significant coefficient.
Specialisation in primary commodities, however, can trigger a form of Dutch disease, whereby labour concentrates in sectors with an existing comparative advantage, at the expense of sectors with higher potential for economies of scale and learning externalities, such as manufacturing. We then test for the importance of a revealed comparative advantage in agriculture or primary commodities, using the share of primary commodities in exports as a proxy. Results indicate that the degree of structural change is negatively correlated with a higher share of primary commodities in a country's exports, suggesting that a specialisation in commodities is likely to slow down the process of structural change. This is in line with the insights of Barbier and Bugas (2014) for Latin America that if available arable land for cultivation is large, it absorbs displaced unskilled labour from elsewhere in the economy, therefore limiting productivity gains and generating a "Dutch disease".
Higher openness to trade can increase foreign competition for domestically produced goods, and therefore provide incentives to countries to make better use of surplus labour in order to improve efficiency. A greater openness to trade is also associated with an increase in total factor productivity. 9 We obtain a strong, positive and statistically significant coefficient of an increased openness to trade on the structural change term, even when controlling for initial conditions (share of agriculture in employment) and comparative advantage in primary commodities. Such results are consistent with the McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) study of structural change in Vietnam, in which they find that trade expansion and liberalisation policies in the "Doi Moi" period (unification and devaluation of the exchange rate, relaxations on import and export quotas, eliminating all budget subsidies for exports starting in 1989) were instrumental in triggering structural change in the economy and a focus on manufacturing at the expense of agriculture and other low productivity sectors.
Higher external capital can act as a substitute or a complement to domestic capital and thus help finance the adoption of new technologies or increase the production of the bestperforming firms. It can also serve as a channel to "import" frontier technologies and organisations, and could therefore be expected to enhance structural change. To proxy for financial openness, we use the sum of the foreign assets and liabilities of a country divided by its GDP, and then estimate the change in this ratio over a decade. We find that the change in financial openness by itself has a positive impact on the structural change term, similar in magnitude to the change in trade openness. However, the coefficient associated with the change in financial openness is not statistically significant.
Using Model 1 among the regressions in Table 5 yields a negative predicted value of structural change for Egypt, which matches the actual result. This is mainly due to the low growth in credit to the private sector, and the large share of primary commodities in Egypt's exports. However, the actual magnitude of this growth-reducing structural change (-7.3 per cent productivity growth in the decade) is much wider than predicted by the regression (-0.3 per cent), essentially because Egypt's increased trade openness failed to trigger the expected increase in structural change: based only on its increased trade openness, Egypt could have expected a positive (growth-enhancing) structural change. This shows that other binding constraints to the efficient reallocation of labour must have been at play in Egypt's disappointing performance.
Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks, including dropping one country at a time and one variable at time, and the findings were broadly unchanged. In order to check for multicollinearity, we regress each predictor on the others and compute the variance inflation factor. All variance inflation factors for predictors in model (1) are below 6, well below the commonly accepted threshold of 10 (see Table 6 ): this warrants an absence of any significant issue of multicollinearity. A number of additional specifications were examined. We add the initial level of capital per worker, obtained from the Penn World Table, along with the change of this variable over a decade, to control for initial sophistication of production and its development and depth. However, this variable has neither a significant nor large effect on overall structural change.
We also test for the impact of the change in average years of schooling of the working-age population over the decade. As higher education standards could lead to both higher productivity within sectors and to incentives for workers to move across sectors, we expect the effect on structural change to be positive but small. However, we do not find a significant impact of a change in the average level of education over the period on the degree of structural change.
In addition, we ran regressions testing for the importance of the change in the real effective exchange rate over the decade (using an index of base 100 in 2007, computed by Bruegel for 178 countries (Darvas, 2012) , and the average share of public fixed capital formation in total fixed capital formation during the decade (computed from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook database). We observe that both variables do not seem to have a significant effect on the structural growth term.
Conclusion and policy implications
Despite their apparent success in liberalising key segments of the economy in the decade from 2000 to 2010, with increased openness to trade, foreign investments and financial flows, Egypt's economic policies over the last decade have failed to ignite significant structural change. No large-scale reallocation of labour from low to high productivity industries occurred, and some low value added sectors even expanded at the expense of more efficient ones, leading to a drag on aggregate productivity growth.
If such a trend were to continue, Egypt's inability to provide quality jobs to its growing middle class and a huge number of new entrants to the labour market every year is likely to endanger socio-political stability and increase the likelihood of reform reversals.
It is therefore of paramount importance for the country to identify the reforms most favourable to a more efficient allocation of the country's major asset, its young and large labour force. These reforms should include sector-level policies, designed to facilitate the rationalisation of low value added industries, and to enable the expansion of firms operating in higher-productivity sectors. In parallel, broader, cross-cutting macroeconomic and business climate reforms are also necessary, to further open up some key sectors to domestic and foreign competition and facilitate the efficient allocation of labour.
Sector-level policies
Agriculture
We have observed that the share of labour employed in agriculture failed to decrease significantly over the last decade. This is partly the result of archaic regulations in the sector, which have led to high land fragmentation. As a result, a large population of individual farmers continues to work on small plots of land, with low productivity by international standards as a result of the failure to benefit from economies of scale. Land consolidation and modernisation of farming practices would allow farmers to benefit from economies of scale and higher efficiency through both improvements in within-sector and across sector productivity. Better management of urbanisation to preserve high quality arable land for agriculture is also important.
Manufacturing
In the manufacturing sector, the removal of distortive energy subsidies, which currently overincentivise the employment of capital relative to labour, could do much to increase labour employment in the manufacturing sector. In addition, adopting more energy-efficient technologies could expand such areas as food processing, biotechnology and labour-intensive consumer electronics.
Private services
There is a need to expand the role of private services in the economy. Further development of the tourism sector in new areas could spur job creation in hotels, transportation and retail services. Attracting tourists from the Gulf and eastern Europe could diversify the sources of revenue as well as destinations for visitors.
Another services sector with much potential for expansion is the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Egypt was ranked fourth in the Global Services Location Index in 2011, a list of the world's most attractive offshoring destinations. While earlier reforms have helped develop the sector, further measures are required for the sector to deliver its potential, including better regulation to ensure fair market practices, expansion of ICT facilitating infrastructure, and meeting labour skill needs.
In other dynamic emerging markets, the expansion of the retail trade sector has been particularly notable, as distribution channels expanded geographically and socially across all ladders of society and consumption of tradable goods became more widespread. In Egypt as well, the development of such retail trade services in remote areas would increase employment opportunities far from the main industrial centres of Cairo and Alexandria.
Cross-cutting reforms
We can draw several implications for broader economic and business climate reforms from the analysis on the determinants of structural change outlined earlier on in this paper.
Access to finance
To facilitate the development of a healthy private sector, a number of reform measures are needed to enhance access to finance. A critical part of this would need to involve addressing the crowding out of private sector lending by the public sector. In addition, further strengthening of the financial infrastructure is critical to enhance credit information, strengthen creditor rights, improve collateral regimes, and expand asset registries. Utilising macro-prudential policies to reduce credit concentration could contribute to increased competition and access to credit. The diversification of a heavily bank-based financial system can help expand the range of financial services, deepen financial intermediation, and promote more competition among banks and other non-bank financial actors.
Industrial and trade policy
A more efficient allocation of labour towards higher value-added and more productive sectors can be addressed by industrial and trade policy. Reducing barriers to trade through accelerating negotiations with the European Union on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is one area worthy of attention. Another is the removal of artificial support to less efficient industries (such as construction, agriculture and public services) through subsidies, lending by state-owned banks and increases in the public wage bill that are divorced from productivity improvements.
Business climate
Improvements in the business climate that help the efficient allocation of resources in the economy are critical to the process of structural change. Egypt's insolvency laws and regulations, for example, make it rather costly and lengthy to close down plants and companies, as shown by the country's consistently low Doing Business ranking on this matter (146th in 2014). Such barriers to the closing of inefficient businesses are likely to slow the process of moving workers towards higher-productivity industries (World Bank, 2014) .
On the flip side, the creation and growth of productive firms can be facilitated by better defining property rights and easing regulations to incentivise the set-up of new firms, removing barriers to entry, fostering fair competition and reducing discretionary enforcement of laws and regulations.
Labour markets
The International Labour Organization's study of structural change (ILO, 2013) emphasises the links between unemployment and under-employment on the one hand, and the absence of structural change on the other. The study identifies the low level of capital investment as one of the main reasons for this absence of structural reallocation of labour in the region, compared with South East Asia or even sub-Saharan Africa. Investment indeed provides incentives for workers to move to higher-productivity industries as wages in these sectors increase; it can also indirectly favour labour reallocation by providing better infrastructure ensuring geographic mobility and therefore the move of workers towards clusters of highvalue added industries. In Egypt, in particular, the relatively low share of public investment (25 per cent of total investment in 2010, after declining throughout the decade) can partly explain the lack of basic infrastructure favouring labour mobility out of rural areas and into clusters of high-productivity economic activities.
Labour mobility can also be boosted by increasing the ease of hiring and firing workers. But a pre-requisite to the efficient allocation of labour is also that workers have the right skills needed in high value-added, productive industries. Thus, addressing Egypt's welldocumented skills mismatch and investing effectively in education in order to better equip graduates to enter the marketplace is a critical policy priority.
36 sub-sectors, which we regrouped and merged into 9 sectors to ensure comparability with the GGDC data.
Data transformations
Using initial data in local currency at current prices, we then established new sector-level price indices for each country-sector pair, rebased in the year 2000, in order to convert all sectoral value added data to constant 2000 prices. To merge data for both decades, the most relevant year of merging was selected by comparing employment and value added data on a country-by-country basis in order to ensure consistency across time, dropping country-decade pairs for which differentials were too high. We merged series from 1990 to 2005 (obtained from the GGDC 10-Sector Database) and series from 1995 to 2010 (obtained from the World Input Output Database or the African Sector Database), using the most relevant base year for each country in order to obtain consistent series for value added and employment by sector across time, and compute sector-level labour productivity.
Using the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook implied PPP conversion rates, data were converted to constant 2000 international US dollar prices, and labour productivity by sector was computed in this unit for purposes of comparability between countries.
Labour productivity in each sector is calculated in order to compare the patterns of labour flows with changes in sector-level productivity. Sector-level labour productivity is defined as output by economic activity over total employment by economic activity, for each given year. A measure of value added per worker is thus obtained at the sector level. To calculate relative labour productivity, end-of-period sector labour productivity is computed as a share of overall labour productivity (obtained as total value added over total employment).
Other control variables were extracted from a number of sources.
 The International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook for government debt and PPP exchange rate data.
-We computed the real growth in debt over a decade by taking the initial and final ratio of debt to GDP, and then adjusting for real GDP growth over the decade to obtain the growth in real debt. -WEO's data on public fixed capital formation and total fixed capital formation in a country in a given year were used to compute the share of public investment; we then averaged this share over a decade to obtain meaningful results.
 The Penn World Tables for capital stock and total factor productivity data.
-The initial and final levels of capital per worker were calculated simply by dividing the capital stock by our employment figures for each country, before computing the growth in capital per worker and in total factor productivity.
 The World Bank's World Development Indicators for domestic credit data.
-We computed real growth in domestic private credit over a decade by taking the initial and final ratios of domestic private credit to GDP, and then adjusting for real GDP growth over the decade in order to obtain the growth in real credit.
 The UNCTAD database for trade openness data as well as the UN COMTRADE for a detailed composition of export flows.
-The UNCTAD database enabled us to compute trade openness as a percentage of GDP, and the change in this ratio for each country-decade pair. We used UN COMTRADE data for a detailed composition of exports, notably regarding the share of manufactured products or of primary commodities in the exports of a country.
 The Cohen-Soto database for educational attainment data.
-Using this database, we obtained the average number of years of schooling for people aged 15-64 at the beginning and end of both decades for each country, and computed the change in average years of schooling over a decade.
 The External Wealth of Nations database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) for foreign investments and financial openness data.
-A canonical ratio of financial openness was calculated as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities of a country divided by its GDP, and then we estimated the change in this ratio over a decade to obtain a proxy for external financial liberalisation.
 The Bruegel Real Effective Exchange Rate database for data on change in the real exchange rate.
-We computed the change in the index (with base 100 in 2007) for each decade-country pair, with a positive figure denoting real appreciation. 
